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Inside RevStealer's Sandbox-Aware Anti-Analysis System

Published on: 06.10.2026



Introduction


We recently came across an interesting Joe Sandbox analysis on Joe Sandbox Cloud Basic that was confirmed as malicious but showed surprisingly little malicious behavior. Samples like this are often particularly interesting because limited activity does not necessarily mean that execution failed. In many cases, it indicates that the malware recognized characteristics of the analysis environment and deliberately suppressed its main functionality.

In this blog post, we examine how RevStealer uses a score-based environment gate to identify analysis systems and decide whether execution should continue.

Score-based evasion techniques have become increasingly common because they allow malware to evaluate multiple environmental signals collectively rather than relying on a single indicators. This makes the detection logic more flexible and more resilient to changes in individual sandbox characteristics.

We recently observed a similar approach in our analysis of ScarfaceStealer, which also used a weighted scoring system to assess the execution environment. You can find that analysis here.

We mainly used Joe Reverser to identify the sandbox evasions in this sample.

A Score-Based Environment Gate


The sample follows a standard packing chain. The sandbox evasion is not part of the packer itself, but is implemented in the final payload:




Immediately before the sandbox evasion checks, the sample performs language-based kill switches commonly observed in other stealer families:




Next, ten checks are executed: nine weighted environment checks and one direct host identity gate.

The checks assess display and GPU characteristics, CPU topology, running processes, physical memory, system uptime, sleep acceleration, hardware H.264 support, and CPUID consistency. If the accumulated score reaches 7, the sample resets its internal state and terminates after a short randomized delay. A single strong indicator can therefore stop execution, while several weaker signals can produce the same outcome.

The table below summarizes the execution order, trigger conditions, and outcome of each check.




Full Joe Reverser report available here. 

To facilitate testing across other sandbox environments, we developed a C++ proof of concept that reproduces the language gate and all ten dispatcher entries.

You find the source here.

Most of these gates and checks are well known and have been observed in other malware families. However, the H.264 encoder probe was new to us.


Hardware H.264 Encoder Probe


The H.264 works as follows: The malware initializes the Media Foundation components and uses MFTEnumEx to enumerate hardware video encoders supporting H.264:



What is H.264? H.264 is a widely used video compression standard that can take advantage of hardware acceleration. However, many sandbox environments run inside virtual machines that do not expose hardware-accelerated video encoding. As a result, a hardware H.264 encoder may not be available inside the guest system.

What makes this evasion technique interesting is that many sandboxes do not monitor Microsoft Media Foundation Transform (MFT) API calls such as MFTEnumEx. Consequently, this type of environment check may go unnoticed.

How does Joe Sandbox defeat this technique? Joe Sandbox supports malware analysis on bare-metal systems, where hardware-accelerated H.264 encoding is typically available. It also supports automatic analysis-system chaining, allowing samples that perform H.264-related environment checks to be automatically re-executed on bare metal:





Malware Family Attribution


So what malware is this? We began attribution with the following three network indicators:

relay7[.]apiforge[.]click
route[.]techquarter[.]xyz
serve[.]eastpeak[.]xyz

The initial pivot on relay7[.]apiforge[.]click linked the domain to RevStealer through ThreatFox (ThreatFox IOC record).

The Malpedia reference for RevStealer pointed to the following MalwareBazaar sample, which we selected as RevStealer reference.

We used Joe Reverser to obtain an overview of its capabilities. The analysis identified FUN_140005FFC as a weighted environment scoring routine for detecting sandboxed and virtualized systems.

Full Joe Reverser Analysis here.

A subsequent Joe Reverser of the investigated payload enabled a closer comparison and revealed the same distinctive anti-analysis design:



Full Joe Reverser analysis here.

Despite differences in dispatcher order and build-specific constants, the two samples preserve the same checks, scoring weights, table structure, hardware validation, and termination logic.

The infrastructure findings were also confirmed using Joe Sandbox:

relay7[.]apiforge[.]click
route[.]techquarter[.]xyz
serve[.]eastpeak[.]xyz

Full Joe Sandbox bare metal analysis here.

Taken together, the infrastructure overlap and the highly specific code-level similarities support the classification of the final native payload as a RevStealer.

Conclusion


RevStealer shows how malware can combine several weak environmental indicators into a more reliable sandbox detection mechanism. Instead of depending on a single check, it assigns weights to multiple signals and terminates once the overall score reaches a defined threshold.

While most of the checks are well known, the hardware H.264 encoder probe stands out. It provides an additional way to distinguish virtualized environments from physical systems and may not be visible to sandboxes that do not monitor the relevant Media Foundation APIs.

The combination of this distinctive anti-analysis logic, matching scoring behavior, and overlapping infrastructure provides strong evidence that the final payload belongs to RevStealer.


Would you like to try Joe Reverser or Joe Sandbox? Register for a free account on Joe Sandbox Cloud Basic and start using it!

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

SHA-256: 

  • e712d2be2d4554c756b6a2b9aaf22dfa2100e31679c6e9eec8d4501c9730a856
  • 6be05bfbb62bbc4f69d83968b58e2accb464843f964849b837199af4131c38d4 (extracted payload from 13543ef85a0988a09ef430a1f114f920a670a82f9e360ff9e6872252062d4768)

C2 domains:

  • relay7[.]apiforge[.]click
  • serve[.]eastpeak[.]xyz
  • route[.]techquarter[.]xyz